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Abstract
Algorithmic-matching sites offer users access to an unprecedented number of poten-
tial mates. However, they also pose a principal-agent problem with a potential moral
hazard. The agent’s interest is to maximize usage of the Web site, while the principal’s
interest is to find the best possible romantic partners. This creates a conflict of inter-
est: optimally matching users would lead to stable couples and fewer singles using the
site, which is detrimental for the online dating industry. Here, we borrow the notion
of Price-of-Anarchy from game theory to quantify the decrease in social efficiency of
online dating sites caused by the agent’s self-interest. We derive theoretical bounds on
the price-of-anarchy, showing it can be bounded by a constant that does not depend on
the number of users of the dating site. This suggests that as online dating sites grow,
their potential benefits scale up without sacrificing social efficiency. Further, we per-
formed experiments involving human subjects in a matching market, and compared the
social welfare achieved by an optimal matching service against a self-interest matching
algorithm. We show that by introducing competition among dating sites, the selfish
behavior of agents aligns with its users, and social efficiency increases.
With online dating on the rise for the past decade, the pool of potential partners has
increased from a few thousands of people that you could meet in your daily life, to millions
of people. Space and time constraints to meet a partner through your existing social circles,
are no longer a restriction with online dating sites; you can potentially be matched with
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any user in any place of the world. Online dating has enormous potential to ameliorate
what is for many people a time-consuming and often frustrating activity. “Online dating is
pervasive, and has fundamentally altered both the romantic acquaintance process and the
process of compatibility matching” [5]. Indeed, 11% of American adults and 38% of those
who are currently single and looking for a partner have used online dating sites or mobile
dating apps [16]. In short, online dating is changing the way we find romantic partners [14].
The vast amount of people using dating services imposes a new problem to service
providers. The set of potential matches are too large for a single user to search exhaustively.
As such, the system must present or suggest a smaller, more tractable subset of potential
matches to the user. This entails that online dating sites must use an algorithm to curate
what is presented to users, based on the large amounts of data the system collects from
them. For example, OkCupid claims1 that their algorithm matches people using “match
percentages”, which basically quantifies how much users have in common. However, none
of these algorithms are fully disclosed.
In the early 70’s, Herbert Simon presaged that wealth of information would create
attention scarcity, and hence, would become a new type of currency [15]. Indeed, we see
technology companies competing to win people’s attention, clicks and loyalty. This notion,
coined as “attention economy” [6, 4], is more relevant than ever, and is considered one of
the most important determinant of business success. For example, in e-commerce, often
more emphasis is being placed on users’ future visits and purchases than on maximizing
their current satisfaction [17]. Economic theory of “planned obsolescence” predicts that
oligopolists will profit from producing goods with shorter durability, to incentivize the
consumers to purchase more frequently [2]. In fact, there is evidence of planned obsolescence
in the textbook market [9], where publishers introduce new editions to decrease the value
of old ones. This raises the following question:
How would the social efficiency of online dating website be affected by planned obso-
lescence, whereby matches with shorter expected “durability” are suggested deliberately, and
better matches are subsequently introduced to decrease the “value” of old matches, all in the
hope of maximizing the likelihood of users coming back to the Web site?
Put differently, since the business model of most online service providers relies heavily
on the number of users they have, this creates a fundamental conflict of interest: optimally
matching users would lead to stable couples and fewer singles using the site, which is detri-
mental for the business. Hence, a self-interested dating service provider that maximizes its
revenue will have as one of its goals the maximization of user engagement, which is seldom
aligned with maximizing user utility. As such, while dating sites offer users access to an
unprecedented number of potential mates, they also pose a principal-agent problem with
a potential moral hazard (e.g., [1]) as the agent (online dating site) has access to more
information than the principal (the user).
Driven by these observations, this paper aims at quantifying the social welfare loss
1https://theblog.okcupid.com
that users may experience from a dating site that maximizes engagement instead of user
utility. In so doing, we take a first step toward quantifying the maximum social-welfare
loss that could result from online dating sites acting selfishly. In particular, we model
the centralized matching as a classical weighted matching on bipartite graphs [12]—with
the novel difference being that self-interest behavior is represented by a different objective
function to the classic objective of maximizing the sum of weights. Namely, the goal of
dating sites is to maximize the users that remain in the system, according to a Markov
decision process. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model the detrimental
effects of selfish (centralized) matchings.
1 Algorithmic Matching
Matching in dating sites is an inherently online problem since there is no complete infor-
mation about the arriving users to the system in advance, but obtained incrementally. In
contrast, we first consider an offline version of the matching problem, in which all users are
known in advance and are in the system from the beginning. The online matching problem
is analyzed in the Supplementary Information (Section S3).
From the perspective of a social designer, the problem of finding partners for everyone
as to maximize social welfare is modeled as a weighted matching on bipartite graphs, where
weights represent how well-matched two individuals are. Here, we assume that men’s and
women’s preferences are known.
Formally, let M := [m] and W := [n] be two finite sets of m “men” and n “women”,
respectively. Each individual i is characterized by a vector: χ(i) ∈ Rd+ if i ∈ M and
κ(i) ∈ Rd+ if i ∈ W. This vector representation is very general, and characterizes each
individual through a set of relevant features, such as age, personality trait, film preferences,
etc. Let wij := f(χ(i), κ(j)) ∈ [0, 1] be a measure of how well-matched individuals i and j
are.
For the offline model, assume all elements in W and M are known by the agent
(or system). The system decides the (partial) distribution xi := (xij : i ∈ M, j ∈
W, ∑j∈W xij ≤ 1) for all i ∈ M, and assigns an element j ∈ W to i with probability xij .
Define the level of satisfaction or utility of i ∈M to be ui :=
∑
j∈W wijxij ∈ [0, 1].
A fair agent (from the users’ point of view) would assign j to i so as to maximize
f(u) :=
∑
i ui. That is, it attempts to solve the following optimization problem:
z∗f (w) :=maxx
∑
i ui (Of (w))
s.t. ui :=
∑
j wijxij , for all i ∈M (1)∑
j∈W xij ≤ 1, for all i ∈M, (2)∑
i∈M xij ≤ 1, for all j ∈ W, (3)
xij ≥ 0, for all i ∈M and j ∈ W. (4)
Given that the problem is modeled on bipartite graphs, this linear program will yield integer
solutions [19]. In other words, there always exists an optimal integer solution to the fair
agent matching problem where every element i ∈ W is matched only with one element
j ∈M or is not match at all.
1.1 Modeling Self-interested Behavior
Next, we introduce the concept of “user engagement” into the matching problem. The
objective function of a self-interested designer of a matching service is to maximize this
value.
We model the situation for user i in relation with the agent (i.e., matching service) by
a Markov decision process with two states si,1 and si,2, representing the states of being
in and out of the system, respectively. The Markov chain is depicted in Figure 1. At
state si,1, there is an infinite action set representing the decision ui ∈ [0, 1]. For each such
action, the user moves to state si,2 with probability one, where he or she stays there with
probability 1− qi(ui) (for either a successful relationship or a complete dissatisfaction with
the matching service), or comes back to the system (state si,1) with probability qi(ui), after
having received a utility ui.
si,1 si,2
1
1− q(ui)
q(ui)
Figure 1: Markov process with two states si,1 and si,2, representing the states of being in
and out of the system, for user i having received utility ui.
Let qi(ui) be the probability that individual i, having received the utility ui, will come
back to the system. We will make the natural assumptions2 that qi(ui) satisfies:
(A1) qi(0) = qi(1) = 0;
(A2) qi(ui) is twice-differentiable in ui ∈ [0, 1];
(A3) qi(ui) is strictly concave in ui ∈ [0, 1].
The intuition behind the assumptions is that users who are dissatisfied by the service (i.e.,
receive a low utility) are less likely to return and in the extreme case of receiving zero
utility, the user will never return to the system. On the other hand, users who are paired
with good matches have less incentives to look for a new partner and in the extreme case
of having received the maximum utility of one (i.e., a perfect match), the user will never
return to the system.
2Some of these assumptions can be relaxed, but we will not do this here to keep the presentation simple.
Let q := (q1, . . . , qm) be the vector of probability functions. For k ∈ {1, 2}, let pii,k(ui)
be the limiting probability that the user will be in state si,k, given that the decision made
by the agent for the user is ui. Then we have:
pii,1(ui) =
qi(ui)
1 + qi(ui)
and pii,2(ui) =
1
1 + qi(ui)
. (5)
Observation 1 pii,1(ui) satisfies (A1), (A2) and (A3) (with qi replaced by pii,1).
The agent would selfishly allocate users so as to maximize the expected number of users
returning to the system s(u;q) :=
∑
i pii,1(ui). That is, the selfish central designer attempts
to solve the following optimization problem:
z∗s (w;q) :=maxx
∑
i
pii,1(ui) (Os(w;q))
s.t. Constraints (1)-(4). (6)
In the offline case, both problems (Of (w)) and (Os(w;q)) can be solved optimally in
polynomial time via linear programming and convex programming, respectively. Next, we
quantify the loss of efficiency in the system induced by the selfish behavior of the central
designer with the notion of Price of Anarchy (PoA) [11].
Definition 1 (Price of Anarchy) Let u∗f and u
∗
s(q) be the optimal solutions of the prob-
lem for the fair agent (Of (w)) and selfish agent (Os(w;q)), respectively. Define the price
of anarchy PoA = PoA(q) ∈ [0, 1] as the ratio between the worst possible selfish matching
and the social optimum. Formally,
PoA(q) := min
w≥0
f(u∗s(q))
f(u∗f )
.
2 Bounds on the Price of Anarchy
In this section, we present our main theoretical result stating that the price of anarchy
can be bounded by a constant that depends only on the functions qi. This result entails
two conclusions: (1) as online dating sites grow, their potential benefits scale up without
sacrificing social efficiency; (2) the loss of social utility is solely driven by user’s behavior,
which is exogenous to the matching service, and thus, if modified can improve the efficiency
of the system. In other words, the system can only exploit users to the extent that they let
it. This idea will be further explored in the next section by modelling users’ behavior in a
competitive market instead of in a monopoly.
Formally, we show that for any vector of probability functions q = (q1, . . . , qm) satisfying
(A1)-(A3), the price of anarchy (PoA(q)) can be bounded by a constant that depends only
on the functions qi, but not on the number of users m.
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Figure 2: Left: The figure shows probability functions qi(u) := u(1− u)(1−α) for different
α’s. Right: The Price of Anarchy as a function of α.
Theorem 1 Let H(q) := maxi∈M{q′i(0)} > 0, and c > 0 be the unique solution of the
equation
c =
H(q)
2
· L(q, c), (7)
where L(q, c) = mini∈M ui(c), and where for i ∈ M, ui(c) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the unique
positive solution of the equation
c = pi′i,1(ui) =
q′i(ui)
(1 + qi(ui))2
. (8)
Then,
PoA(q) ≥ L(q, c)/2.
Example 1 Let us suppose that qi(ui) := ui(1−ui)(1−α) for all i = 1, . . . ,m, which satisfies
assumptions (A1)-(A3) for 0 ≤ α < 1. Figure 2 depicts the probabilities for different
α’s. Next, for ease of exposition, we find the Price of Anarchy for α = 0 and show in
Figure 2 the results for all α’s. Let ui = u be the unique solution of Equation (11): c =
(1 − 2u)/((1 − u)u + 1)2. Also, we have that H(q) = q′(0) = 1, and c is chosen to satisfy
(10), which means that c = u/2. The unique solution in (0, 1) is u = 0.363, which implies
that PoA(q) ≥ 0.1815.
2.1 The Invisible-Hand Effect
So far, we have considered the monopolistic case where users only have one option to
go and get matched. However, in a competitive market, utility-maximizing users who
freely choose among competing dating sites will steer the system towards a better social
utility. Next, we explore the effect of competition among dating sites. To this end, we
assume that users’ probability to remain dating in a particular site is proportional to the
utility they have previously received by that site. That is, the conditional probability of
a user returning to the same dating site having received previously a utility of ui, given
that he or she wants to date again is Pr(return|dates again) = ui. The probability of
dating again is define as in the previous section, i.e., Pr(dates again) = q(ui). Thus,
Pr(return) = Pr(return|dates again) Pr(dates again) = ui · q(ui). Similarly, given that a
user wants to date again, he or she will consider a competing dating site with probability
1− ui.
si,1 si,2 si,3
1
1− q(ui)
q(ui) · ui q(ui)(1− ui)
1− 
Figure 3: Markov process with three-states si,1, si,2 and si,3, representing, respectively, the
states of being dating in the system; not looking for a partner; and being out of the system
(or in the competition), for user i having received utility ui.
We extend the Markov decision process defined in Section 1.1, to model the situation
with competition for user i as a three-state Markov process. The first state represents
looking for a partner with the dating agent; the second represents being in the system but
not looking for a partner; the third represents leaving to a competitor dating site. We
assume that once a user leaves, there is a small probability  of returning back.  > 0
ensures the Markov chain is ergodic and has a stationary distribution. The Markov chain
is depicted in Figure 3.
From state si,1, the user moves to state si,2 with probability 1, where he or she stays there
with probability 1− qi(ui) (for either a successful relationship or a complete dissatisfaction
with the agent), or comes back to the system (state si,1) with probability qi(ui) · ui (notice
that without competition this probability was qi(ui)). The user can also move to state si,3
(for a user switching to the competition) from state si,2 with probability qi(ui)(1 − ui),
where he or she stays there with probability 1 −  ( being smaller as the competition is
higher), or comes back to the system with probability . Then we have
pii,1(ui) =
q(ui)
1 + qi(ui) +
qi(ui)
 (1− ui)
. (9)
Note that pii,1(ui) is not necessarily a concave function, and thus, the result from Theorem 1
cannot be directly applied. However, we show in the following lemma that as competition
between service providers grows, the self-interested behavior of system designers converges
to maximize the social utility of users. We present empirical validation in Example S1.
Lemma 1 argmaxui pii,1(ui) = 1, as → 0.
3 Experimental Study
Our theoretical results provide bounds on the Price of Anarchy, which is defined as the
worst-case efficiency level. We showed that even in a monopolistic setting, the price of
anarchy can be bounded by a constant that does not depend on the number of users, but
only depends on users’ implicit expectation of the system. However, our theoretical results
are constrained to the functional form qi dictating users behavior, which in practice can
vary from one user to another and even change over time (although, we do expect that in
the average, the overall behavior follows assumptions (A1) to (A3) from Section 1.1). To
overcome this issue, we designed a human subject experiment to test our results, where q
is learned from the participants.
In a series of experiments, we compared the social welfare achieved by the optimal
matching algorithm against the selfish matching algorithm. We operationalized the algo-
rithmic matching market as a centralized multi-armed bandit problem. Figure 4 provides a
high-level illustration of the experiment. In more detail, participants arrive into the market
and are assigned to a slot machine that gives them a stochastic payoff. Participants play
for ten rounds, at each round deciding between three options: (1) continue with the slot
machine assigned; (2) request from the central designer to be assigned a new slot machine;
(3) or take the risk-free outside option and finish the game. To make this analogy more
concrete, payoffs capture going out on a date with someone and observing the value of their
match; option (1) would represent having multiple dates with the same match and engaging
in a long-term relationship; option (2) represents going back to the dating site to find a
new match; and finally option (3) would be users that either move to a different dating site
or stop using online dating altogether.
The algorithm used to match players takes two forms. The Fair matching algorithm
assigns agents to slot machines in order to maximize the social utility of all agents. The
Selfish matching algorithm assigns agents to slot machines in order to maximize the number
of agents requesting re-assignations to the system. One of the advantages of this experi-
mental design is that the central designer has perfect information on the expected payoffs,
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Option (1): Continue with the same machine, 
(i.e., have another date with the same partner) 
Option (2): Request to be assigned to another 
unassigned machine (i.e., go back to the dating 
site and find a new partner to date)
Option (3): End the game and get 6 cents for 
each unplayed round (i.e., switch to another 
dating cite, or stop online dating altogether)
EXIT
Each participant is assigned a slot 
machine that gives a stochastic 
payoff (i.e., each participant dates 
a partner suggested by the site).
Figure 4: An illustration of the experimental study, showing the initial assignments of
participants, and the three options available in each of the 10 rounds of the experiment.
which allows us to quantify the impact of the matching algorithms without having to deal
with the challenges of inferring and predicting the preferences of users, which is out of the
scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to [8] for a work on estimating mate
preferences from an online dating service.
Therefore, the Fair matching algorithm is given by solving problem Of (w). However,
for the selfish matching, in order to solve Os(w;q) we need to learn the probability qi(u)
that a user having received utility u, will come back to the system on round i. Given
that individual data is sparse, we assume users are homogeneous and start with a prior
probability q1(u) satisfying assumptions (A1) to (A3). Then, we update the probability
based on the past choices of participants as follows:
qi+1(u) = αqi(u) + (1− α)fi(u),
where fi(u) is the fraction of participants who, having received a payoff u at round i,
requested to be re-assigned; see Figures S5 to S7 for the distribution of fi(u).
Each instance of the game consists of 2n participants which are evenly randomized
between the two experimental conditions: the Fair matching algorithm and the Selfish
matching algorithm. Each player i ∈ [n] has a mean payoff E[pij ] = wj + i for each of the
j ∈ [m] slots machines, where i is a realization of a normally distributed variable with zero
mean and variance of 3. Thus, rewards from machines are correlated across participants,
meaning that there is competition for high yielding slot machines. The game is played in
real-time (or synchronously) with other players, such that any slot machine at any time can
only be assigned to one player in one of the experimental conditions. That is, if a participant
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Figure 5: Distribution of payoffs. The top distributions of each sub-figure correspond
to the payoff distribution of all user-slot pairs for each study. The bottom distributions
depict the realized payoffs experienced by participants. That is, it correspond to the payoff
distribution of user-slot pairs that were matched. Vertical dashed lines represent the mean of
the distribution. The universal distributions correspond to the realized payoffs of a matching
algorithm that randomly assigns users to slots. Notice that for the Selfish algorithm there
is a shift towards the left compared to the universal (slightly decreasing the mean), whereas
for the Fair algorithm the shift is towards the right and a significant increase in the mean.
decides to remain with that slot in the next round, then that slot will be unavailable for
other participants. If the participant decides to switch from a slot machine, then he or she
will never be assigned again to the same slot. To continue our analogy with dating services,
the above represents the case where users date only one partner at a time; the partner is
not dating anyone else; and some users are more universally appealing than others.
Rewards of the slots are stochastic and their mean payoffs are known in advance by the
central designer, but not to the participants. Formally, if player i is assigned to slot j, he or
she receives a payoff following a normal distribution with mean E[pij ] = wj+i (and variance
set to 3). Hence, users need repeated interactions to estimate the underlying reward. To
compare the matching algorithms, the mean payoffs of players from slot machines are the
same across the two matching conditions, e.g., the first participant assigned to the Fair
condition has the same mean payoff per slot machine as the first participant assigned to
the Selfish condition.
At any round, the participants may choose to stop being matched by the algorithm and
take an outside payment of 6 cents for each round that is left unplayed, or may choose
to continue playing in the hope of making a greater profit. We ran three studies with
groups of 2n = 6 participants simultaneously and m = 13 slots machines, that only differ
in how the payoffs pij ’s are distributed: Study A represents a competitive market (80-
20 rule) where payoffs follow a right-skewed distribution; Study B has payoffs following a
symmetric distribution (similar to a normal), and Study C represents a non-competitive
market where payments follow a left-skewed distribution. The top histograms in Figure 5
show the distribution for each study. The underlying distribution of possible payoffs also
correspond to how payoffs would look like if the matching algorithm was randomly assigning
users to slots. The lower histograms in Figure 5 show the distribution or realized payoffs
that users got in each experimental condition. Compared to the underlying distribution,
the Fair algorithm is able to transform the distribution of payoffs, increasing the mean
payoff and shifting the distribution to the right in all three studies. On the other hand, the
Selfish algorithm performs worse than the underlying distribution, and is therefore inferior
to random matching.
Figure 6 depicts the mean payments and engagement rates of participants in each study.
Regarding the payments, the Fair matching algorithm achieves an overall greater utility
than the Selfish algorithm. This difference is at most double the utility achieved by the
Selfish algorithm, and it decreases across studies as the market becomes less competitive.
Naturally, in the Fair algorithm, payoffs decrease over time given that by definition, each
assignment maximizes the social welfare. Thus, any subsequent changes of assignation
can only decrease the overall utility, but will not necessarily decrease the payment of an
individual participant. Focusing on engagement rates, defined as the percentage of users
requesting to be re-matched, we find that the Selfish algorithm (whose objective function
is to maximize engagement) yields at lest 50% higher rates than the Fair matching. Figure
S8 shows the average PoA over pairs of instances whose initial conditions are the same.
We note that for some rounds the maximum was greater than 1, meaning that the Selfish
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Figure 6: Figures a-c: In each sub-figure, the left plot shows the mean overall payment
received by participants; the right plot shows the mean payoffs received per round (standard
error bars are calculated over the mean per groups). Figures d-f: In each sub-figure, the
left plot shows the mean overall engagement rate by participants; the right plot shows the
engagement rates per round, where engagement rate is defined as the percentage of users
requesting to be re-matched.
algorithm performed better than the Fair algorithm in some cases.
Overall, our main findings are as follows: As the markets become less competitive,
the loss of social welfare generated by the Selfish matching algorithm decreases, while the
gain in engagement rates across studies remains constant. At the same time, the Selfish
algorithm does not induce any significant change over the rate of users taking the outside
option compared to the Fair algorithm (See Figure S9). In the extreme competitive case,
Study A, the mean utility of users under the Selfish algorithm was exactly what they could
have gotten as an outside payment had they decided not to play. This is a surprising
result given that the algorithm was totally agnostic about the outside payment and its
value. Rather, the algorithm learns, based on the implicit feedback given by users’ actions,
to maximize the probability that a user clicks again. Through this feedback loop, the
algorithm self regulates the system to keep payments near but above the baseline to keep
engagement high at a minimum cost to the system. Thus, suggesting that users’ implicit
expectations of their potential utility, both in the system and out, drive the Selfish matching
algorithm to perform in different ways.
4 Related Work
Closely related to our question is the concern of inefficiencies that can arise due to the
behavior of users in online dating platforms. Kanoria and Saban [10] present a two-sided
matching market, where strategic agents on both sides are able to screen potential partners,
and a match results only upon approval by both sides of the market. The authors char-
acterize the equilibria as a function of the screening costs that agents in both sides of the
market incur when looking for matches. Then, they show that simple interventions such
as to block one of the sides from screening, leading to a one-sided search, can improve the
social welfare. There is empirical evidence of such asymmetries when screening for partners,
for example, women are much more selective than men in Tinder [18]. Empirical studies in
online dating sites are also looking to estimate mate preferences, and have found that both
women and men have a strong preference for similarity along many attributes [8]. Using the
estimated mate preferences based on a particular online dating site, one study shows that
the online dating site achieves near optimal matching compared with the optimal matching
predicted by the Gale-Shapley algorithm in a two-sided market [7].
5 Discussion and Open Problems
Our results shed new light on how self-interest behavior by online dating sites impacts the
social welfare of its users. We introduce and study a model, based on the classic matching
problem on graphs, to represent self-interest behavior by dating sites. We quantify the
social efficiency of dating sites using the notion of Price-of-Anarchy to capture how much the
system degrades users’ utility due to selfish behavior of the agent. We establish theoretical
bounds that do not depend on the number of users for the Price of Anarchy, regardless of
whether the system knows beforehand all users or if they arrive sequentially (See SI Section
S3). Further, we put to experimental test our model, and create a matching market with
human subjects to compare the social welfare achieved by an optimal matching service
against a selfish matching algorithm.
Overall, we have optimistic results suggesting that the dating apocalypse3 is not here,
yet. Indeed, a recent study suggests that online couples have lower odds of getting married
than offline couples [13], however, conditioned on being married, online married couples are
slightly less likely to result in marital break-ups [3]. This study is a first step towards under-
standing the impact of algorithms on society, and opens up several problems and challenges.
Our daily lives are increasingly being affected by black-box systems, and we advocate the
need for more regulation of these systems. It is our responsibility as researchers to under-
stand, quantify and inform policy makers of the possible—intentional or otherwise—side
effects of algorithms.
3Tinder and the Dawn of the “Dating Apocalypse”, Vanity Fair, 2015
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Supplementary Information
Supplementary Proofs
Observation 1 pii,1(ui) satisfies (A1), (A2) and (A3) (with qi replaced by pii,1).
Proof (A1) and (A2) are immediate from (5). To see that pii,1(ui) is concave in ui ∈ [0, 1],
note that its second derivative is given by
pi′′i,1(ui) =
(1 + qi(ui))q
′′
i (ui)− 2(q′i(ui))2
(1 + qi(ui))3
,
which is strictly negative for ui ∈ [0, 1] by the strict concavity assumption on qi(·). 
Theorem 1 Let h(q) := mini∈M{q′i(0)} > 0, H(q) := maxi∈M{q′i(0)}, and c ∈ (0, h(q))
be the unique solution of the equation
c =
H(q)
2
· L(q, c), (10)
where L(q, c) = mini∈M ui(c), and where for i ∈ M, ui(c) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the unique
positive solution of the equation
pi′i,1(ui) =
q′i(ui)
(1 + qi(ui))2
= c. (11)
Then PoA(q) ≥ L(q, c)/2.
Proof First note that the solutions in (10) and (11) are well-defined, since the strict
concavity of qi(ui) in [0, 1] implies that the function pi′i,1(ui) =
q′i(ui)
(1+qi(ui))2
is strictly decreas-
ing in [0, 1], which in turn implies that the function L(q, c) is also strictly decreasing in
c ∈ [0, h(q)]. It follows that the right-hand side of (10) is strictly decreasing in c ∈ [0, h(q)],
and assumes a positve value when c = 0, and a value of 0 when c = h(q), implying that the
root c in (10) exists.
Fix any optimal solutions (u∗,x∗) and (û, x̂) for problems (Of (w)) and (Os(w;q)),
respectively. Then our to goal is to lower-bound∑
i∈M ûi∑
i∈M u
∗
i
. (12)
Fix c > 0 as given by (10), and let S(c) := {i ∈ M : pi′i,1(ûi) > c}. If one tries to
bound the ratio directly by using the simple (local) lower bound mini ûiu∗i , one runs into the
difficulty that some of the ûi’s could be very close to zero (even though not exactly zero
as the function s(u;q) is strictly concave). To overcome this, we use the local bound only
for users not in S(c), while for users in S(c) we use a global bound derived from the KKT
optimality conditions. This is formalized in the following two claims.
Claim 1 Suppose that i ∈M \ S(c), then ûi ≥ L(q,c)2 (u∗i + ûi).
Proof Immediate from the definitions since pi′i,1(ûi) ≤ c implies, by the concavity of qi,
that ûi ≥ ui(c) ≥ L(q, c) ≥ L(q, c)(u∗i + ûi)/2. 
Claim 2
∑
i∈M u
∗
i ≤ 1c
∑
i∈S(c), j∈W pi
′
i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij +
∑
i∈M\S(c)(u
∗
i + ûi).
Proof Consider problem (Os(w;q)). By the KKT (necessary) conditions for optimality
(which are also sufficient since the functions pii,1(·) are concave by Observation (1)), there
exist β̂i ≥ 0, σ̂j ≥ 0, and µ̂ij ≥ 0, for i ∈ M and j ∈ W, such that (1)-(4) hold for
(u,x) = (û, x̂), and
−pi′i,1(ûi)wij + β̂i + σ̂j = µ̂ij , for all i ∈M and j ∈ W, (13)
µ̂ij x̂ij = 0, for all i ∈M and j ∈ W, (14)
β̂i(
∑
j∈W
x̂ij − 1) = 0, for all i ∈M, (15)
σ̂j(
∑
i∈M
x̂ij − 1) = 0, for all j ∈ W. (16)
Note that (2), (3), and (13)-(16) imply that∑
i∈M, j∈W
pi′i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij =
∑
i∈M
β̂i +
∑
j∈W
σ̂j , (17)
β̂i + σ̂j ≥ pi′i,1(ûi)wij , for all i ∈M and j ∈ W. (18)
Let us next define a new set of weights w˜, obtained from w by setting w˜ij = 0 for all
i ∈M\S(c) and j ∈ W. Let (u˜, x˜) be an optimal solution to problem Of (w˜). Clearly, by
the feasibility of u∗i for (2) and (3),∑
i∈M
u∗i ≤
∑
i∈S(c)
u˜i +
∑
i∈M\S(c)
u∗i . (19)
Let us write the dual for LP Of (w˜) (in the variables β := (βi : i ∈ S(c)) and σ :=
(σ1, . . . , σn)):
z∗f (w˜) :=min
β,σ
∑
i∈S(c)
βi +
∑
j∈W
σj (Df (w˜))
s.t. βi + σj ≥ wij , for all i ∈ S(c) and j ∈ W, (20)
βi ≥ 0, σj ≥ 0, for all i ∈ S(c) and j ∈ W. (21)
From (18), we have for i ∈ S(c) and j ∈ W: β̂i + σ̂j ≥ c · wij . Thus, the pair of vectors
(β′, σ′) := (( β̂ic : i ∈ S(c)), (
σ̂j
c : j ∈ W)) is feasible for the dual LP Of (w˜). It follows that∑
i∈S(c)
u˜i = z
∗
f (w˜) (by LP duality)
≤ 1
c
 ∑
i∈S(c)
β̂i +
∑
j∈W
σ̂j
 (by the feasibility of (β′, σ′) for (Df (w˜)))
≤ 1
c
 ∑
i∈S(c), j∈W
pi′i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij +
∑
i∈M\S(c), j∈W
pi′i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij
 (by (17))
≤ 1
c
 ∑
i∈S(c), j∈W
pi′i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij + c
∑
i∈M\S(c)
∑
j∈W
wij x̂ij
 (by definition of S(c))
=
1
c
 ∑
i∈S(c), j∈W
pi′i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij + c
∑
i∈M\S(c)
ûi
 (by feasibility of x̂ for (Of (w))).
(22)
Using (22) in (19), we arrive at the claim. 
Finally, using the above two claims, we get∑
i∈M ûi∑
i∈M u
∗
i
≥
∑
i∈S(c), j∈W wij x̂ij +
∑
i∈M\S(c) ûi
1
c
∑
i∈S(c), j∈W pi
′
i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij +
∑
i∈M\S(c)(u
∗
i + ûi)
≥ min
{
c · min
i∈S(c)
1
pi′i,1(ûi)
, min
i∈M\S(c)
ûi
u∗i + ûi
}
≥ min
{
c · 1
maxi∈S(c) pi′i,1(0)
,
L(q, c)
2
}
(23)
≥ min
{
c
H(q)
,
L(q, c)
2
}
=
L(q, c)
2
, (24)
where (23) follows from the concavity of qi and Claim 1; (24) follows from (10). The
theorem follows. 
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Figure S1: The figure shows the empirical Price of Anarchy for probability function qi(u) :=
u(1−u), for different ’s. The empirical Price of Anarchy is obtained as the minimum ratio
of utility between the selfish and optimal matching, across several instances randomizing
the preference weights.
Lemma 1 argmaxui pii,1(ui) = 1, as → 0.
Proof To derive the above result, we show that the global optimum u∗i of pii,1(ui) is the
unique solution satisfying,
pi′i,1(u
∗
i ) =
q′i(u
∗
i ) +
q2i (u
∗
i )
(
1 + qi(u∗i ) +
qi(u∗i )
 (1− u∗i )
)2 = 0,
or equivalently,
 = −q
2
i (u
∗
i )
q′i(u
∗
i )
. (25)
Given that  > 0, Equation (25) holds only if q′i(u
∗
i ) < 0. This in turn means that u
∗
i ∈
[u′i, 1], where u
′
i is the solution to q
′
i(u
′
i) = 0. It follows from the concavity of q that − q
2
i (ui)
q′i(ui)
is decreasing in the interval ui ∈ [u′i, 1]. Therefore, u∗i must be unique. Furthermore, as
→ 0, we have that q2i (u∗i )→ 0, or equivalently, u∗i → 1. 
Example S1 We validate our findings with a numerical example. Figure S1 depicts the
convergence predicted for the probability function qi(u) := u(1− u) using empirical results.
The empirical Price of Anarchy is obtained as the minimum ratio of utility between the
selfish and optimal matching, across several instances randomizing the preference weights.
That is, for each instance we generate a set of random weights w sampled from a Beta
distribution (with parameters (2, 2)). Then, we solve the optimal matching Of (w), the
selfish matching Os(w;q) and obtain the ratio of their utilities.
Supplementary Text - Bounds on PoA in the Online Model
As in the previous sections, we are interested in quantifying the efficiency of assignments
for the online selfish matching problem (Os(w;q)) with respect to assignments for the fair
matching problem (Of (w)). Inspired by the notion of competitive ratio, we extend the
definition of price of anarchy for the online model as follows.
Definition 2 (Price of Anarchy for the online model) Let A be an online matching
algorithm for solving the selfish matching problem (Os(w;q)) and s(uAs ;q) be the objective
value of the online strategy. Let u∗f ∈ argmax{f(u) : u satisfies (1)-(4)}. Define the price
of anarchy PoAA = PoAA(q) ∈ [0, 1], (from the point of view of the users) with respect to
algorithm A, as:
PoAA(q) := min
w≥0
f(uAs )
f(u∗f )
.
Next, we analyze the PoA of the greedy policy for the selfish (probabilistic) matching
problem. The greedy algorithm, upon arrival of element i ∈ M, decides the (partial)
distribution xi := (xij : i ∈ M, j ∈ W,
∑
j∈W xij ≤ 1) that maximizes pii,1(ui), and
assigns an element j ∈ W to i with probability xij (with probability 1−
∑
j∈W xij user i is
not assigned); the agent may also be required to ensure that
∑
i∈M xij ≤ 1 for all j ∈ W.
Theorem 2 Let A be the greedy policy for the selfish (probabilistic) matching problem.
Then,
PoAA(q) ≥ L(q, c)/2,
where L(q, c) is defined as in Theorem 1.
Proof Let i ∈ M be the ith requested element in the online algorithm. Upon arrival of
element i ∈M, the greedy algorithm solves:
max
xi
pii,1(ui) (26)
s.t. ui :=
∑
j
wijxij , (27)∑
j∈W
xij ≤ 1, (28)∑
k≤i
xkj ≤ 1, for all j ∈ W, (29)
xij ≥ 0, for all j ∈ W. (30)
Notice that the only difference of this problem with respect to the offline model comes from
the set of constraints (29), which specify the availability of element j ∈ W at time i. By
the KKT (necessary) conditions for optimality, there exists β̂i ≥ 0, σ̂i,j ≥ 0, and µ̂ij ≥ 0,
for i ∈M and j ∈ W, such that (27)-(30) hold for (u,x) = (û, x̂), and
−pi′i,1(ûi)wij + β̂i + σ̂i,j = µ̂ij , for all i ∈M and j ∈ W, (31)
µ̂ij x̂ij = 0, for all i ∈M and j ∈ W, (32)
β̂i(
∑
j∈W
x̂ij − 1) = 0, for all i ∈M, (33)
σ̂i,j(
∑
k≤i
x̂kj − 1) = 0, for all i ∈M and j ∈ W. (34)
For any j ∈ W, taking the sum of constraints in (34) over i ∈M gives,∑
i∈M
σ̂i,jxij =
∑
i∈M
σ̂i,j(1−
∑
k<i
xkj) ≥ σ1,j ,
which implies that ∑
i∈M, j∈W
σ̂i,jxij ≥
∑
j∈W
σ1,j .
From this formula, together with (28),(29), (31)-(34), it follows that
∑
i∈M, j∈W
pi′i,1(ûi)wij x̂ij ≥
∑
i∈M
β̂i +
∑
j∈W
σ̂1,j , (35)
β̂i + σ̂1,j ≥ pi′i,1(ûi)wij , for all i ∈M and j ∈ W. (36)
From (36), we have for c > 0, i ∈ S(c) and j ∈ W: β̂i + σ̂1,j ≥ c · wij . Thus, the pair of
vectors (β′, σ′) := (( β̂ic : i ∈ S(c)), (
σ̂1,j
c : j ∈ W)) is feasible for the dual LP Of (w˜). As
such, the result follows from (22), (19) and (24). 
Supplementary Text - Experimental Study
We ran three studies with groups of 2n = 6 participants playing simultaneously; these
were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each study consisted of m = 13 slots
machines, and the studies only differ in how the payoffs wj ’s were distributed: Study A
represents a competitive market where payments follow a right-skewed Beta distribution
β(1, 2); Study B has payments following a symmetric Beta distribution β(2, 2), and Study C
represents a non-competitive market where payments follow a left-skewed Beta distribution
β(2, 1). Table S1 shows a summary of the users in each of the three studies.
Participants Players pergroup Outside payoff
Distribution
of payoffs
Study A 113 3 6 cents β(1, 2)
Study B 87 3 6 cents β(2, 2)
Study C 87 3 6 cents β(2, 1)
Table S1: Summary of participants for each experiment.
(a) Screenshot of the interface shown at each round to participants. Users are shown their last
payoff, their accumulated payment so far, and the three options for the next round.
(b) Screenshot of the waiting page after participants take a decision at each round. This is displayed
until all 6 users in the game have taken a decision for the current round.
Figure S2: Screenshots of the experiments shown to participants.
The algorithm used to match players takes two forms. The Fair matching algorithm
assigns agents to slot machines in order to maximize the social utility of all agents. The
Selfish matching algorithm assigns agents to slot machines in order to maximize the number
of agents requesting re-assignations to the system. Therefore, the Fair matching algorithm
is given by solving problem Of (w). However, for the selfish matching, in order to solve
Os(w;q) we need to learn the probability qi(u) that a user having received utility u, will
come back to the system on round i. Given that individual data is sparse, we assume that
the users are homogeneous, and start with a prior probability q1(u) = u(1 − u) satisfying
assumptions (A1) to (A3). Then, we update the probability based on the past choices of
participants as follows:
qi+1(u) = αqi(u) + (1− α)fi(u),
where fi(u) is the fraction of participants who, having received a payoff u at round i,
requested to be re-assigned. In other words, fi(u) is the empirical probability of switching,
defined as the ratio of participants who requested a re-match from the system, having
received a payoff of u at round i. Figures S3, S4 and S5 depict the distribution fi(u)
for the different rounds and algorithms in studies A, B and C, respectively. As can be
seen, the switching rates of participants who received payoffs below 6 cents are surprisingly
high, given that they could choose the risk-free outside option of 6 cents. Additionally, we
observe a decreasing trend of switching rates for high payments (16-20 cents) as the number
of rounds advances. Taken together, these results suggest that participants are risk takers,
but their propensity to take risk decreases in the final rounds of the game.
Figure S6 shows the average PoA over pairs of instances whose initial conditions are the
same. We note that for some rounds the maximum was greater than 1, meaning that the
Selfish algorithm performed better than the Fair algorithm in some cases. For example, in
Study A, for some instances the social welfare under the Selfish algorithm was up to 1.5
times greater than the social welfare of the Fair algorithm.
In the main paper, we show that as markets become less competitive, the loss in social
welfare generated by the Selfish matching algorithm decreases, however, the gain of engage-
ment rates across studies remains constant. At the same time, the Selfish algorithm does
not induce any significant change over the rate of users taking the outside option compared
with the Fair algorithm; see Figure S7. Drop rates, i.e., the percentage of participants that
took the outside option, is slightly higher for the Fair algorithm, however, the difference is
statically insignificant. Overall, the Selfish algorithm increases engagement rates, without
increasing the drop rates.
(a) Fair Algorithm
(b) Selfish Algorithm
Figure S3: Probability of switching for Study A. Distribution of the fraction of participants
having received a payoff u at round i that requested to be re-assigned.
(a) Fair Algorithm
(b) Selfish Algorithm
Figure S4: Probability of switching for Study B. Distribution of the fraction of participants
having received a payoff u at round i that requested to be re-assigned. Blank columns
correspond to no user receiving a payoff in that corresponding range.
(a) Fair Algorithm
(b) Selfish Algorithm
Figure S5: Probability of switching for Study C. Distribution of the fraction of participants
having received a payoff u at round i that requested to be re-assigned. Blank columns
correspond to no user receiving a payoff in that corresponding range.
Figure S6: Average Price of Anarchy for the three different studies. The plot shows
the mean Price of Anarchy between the fair and selfish algorithm, controlling for initial
conditions. Error bars depict the maximum and minimum levels.
(a) Study A (b) Study B (c) Study C
Figure S7: Drop Rate. Drop rate is defined as the percentage of users taking the outside
payment and thus, leaving the system.
